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ESSAY

LEGAL WRITING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
LESSONS FROM A SPECIAL TEACHER AND A
SPECIAL "CLASSROOM"t
The HonorableKenneth F. Ripple*
After receiving the invitation to address this conference, I found
my thoughts often returning to my own education in legal writing. As
I recall, my legal writing experience in law school was not a very intensive-or positive-one. As was quite typical in that era (almost thirtythree years ago), the program at my law school was not very extensive:
we wrote a memorandum of law and a brief under the guidance of a
graduate law student.
My real legal writing education took place in the study of the
Chief Justice of the United States. For the better part of five years, I
sat across from him at a massive library table as he wrote his opinions.'
The lessons of those years deeply influenced my own approach to
legal writing, to the legal writing that I have required of my students at
Notre Dame, and to the legal writing that I expect of my own law
clerks as they assist me as I once assisted the Chief Justice.
Tonight, I want to share with you some of my memories of those
days and of the lessons learned.2 The Chief Justice was a great
teacher; his methods were his own special admixture of lecture, practicum, and critique. Above all, it was his vision, his global understanding of the place of writing in the legal enterprise, that made this
melange of methods so effective. I shall try to convey to you the wist This essay was originally delivered at the Notre Dame Colloquium on Legal
Discourse, July 27, 1998.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1 See Kenneth F. Ripple, In Memoriam: Warren E. Burger, 109 HnAv. L. REv. 5
(1995).
2 For additional insights on lessons learned from the Chief Justice, seeJohn E.
Sexton, A Tribute to WarrenE. Burger, 100 HAuv. L. REv. 979 (1987); Kenneth W. Starr,
A Tribute to ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger, 100 HARv. L. REv. 971 (1987).
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dom of that vision. Hopefully, you will find it helpful as you prepare
the newest members of our profession for the practice of law in the
new millennium.
For the ChiefJustice, writing was not just a means of communication. It was a necessary tool for thinking through the most difficult
problems. For him, tough analytical thought and precise legal reasoning were not the product of oral disputation. Rather, the fundamental intellectual process of lawyering and judging occurred when the
validity of an initial hunch or intuitive flash 3 was tested by pen meeting legal pad. As the pen met paper, private musings and oral dialogue were transformed into solid analysis or discarded as useless as
he searched for the appropriate outline of the opinion, the "best"
phrase, the "right" word to convey a thought. After reading briefs,
studying cases, and listening to oral arguments, he would often say,
"Let's see how it writes out."
Through the process of draft and redraft, the shape of the opinion would change, not just in form but in substantive content. As he
edited the piece, he was clearing not just useless words but irrelevant
intellectual underbrush. Sometimes, he would lose his way and retrace his steps by reading and rereading earlier drafts. On other occasions, after many attempts, he would put the pen down and declare
that "it just won't write." This was not a statement of despair but one
of discovery. He had found the flaw in his reasoning and had to jettison his presuppositions about the case and start over in a new
direction.
In recognizing the importance of writing as a tool of thinking,
the ChiefJustice followed a long-standing intellectual discipline of our
profession. Justice Frankfurter, describing Justice Brandeis, wrote:
Thought for him was the product of brooding, not the windfall of
inspiration. He believed in taking pains, and the corollary of taking
pains was taking time. And he spent no less time in the expression
of thought than in its conception. Aim at excellence is often a paralyzing evasion of effort. In Mr. Justice Brandeis it was an expression
of the aesthetic side of his nature, but even more it was a response
to his desire for utmost effectiveness in communicating thought.
The ultimately right word and the delicate use of punctuation were
as carefully weighed as the idea of which they were the vehicles. He
was rigorous in his standards of appreciation of others. Of himself,
he was ruthlessly exacting. Even after the long incubating process
of maturing an opinion-the wide range of investigation, the toilsome study within it, the slow, careful writing of findings and con3 See J.C. Hutchinson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive. The Function of the "Hunch" in
JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 272 (1919).
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clusions-it was routine for him to revise his draft opinion again
and again, often more than a dozen times. In at least one instance
there were fifty-three revisions. One sample of this laborious, intelligent procedure, in which twenty-six drafts went to the, printer, will
4
illustrate the morality of his mind.
Today, in the federal judiciary, we try to live up to this standard.
One of the very best continuing legal education programs I have attended as a judge took place at a joint meeting of the judges of the
First and Seventh Circuits. As part of the program, we discussed opinion -writing. We began with the question: "For whom do we write?"
Notably, the consensus that grew out of our discussion was that our
primary audience was ourselves. Our own writing either convinced us
of the correctness of our course or of the error of our ways.
For the ChiefJustice, writing was also a way of helping people to
reason together. When faced with a fractured vote at the Court's impression conference, the ChiefJustice often asked the intellectual antagonists to write out their views and to then circulate them to the
entire court. The writing process and the subsequent exchange of
views required the various authors to tighten their reasoning, to present their ideas succinctly, and to meet head on opposing views. The
sunlight of the written word soon melted impressionistic thinking.
Slowly but surely, a consensus formed around a particular memorandum that soon became the draft opinion of the court.
The Chief Justice's appreciation of the role of writing in the process of legal analysis did not eclipse his desire that his writing communicate well the end-product of his thinking. An extremely rapid
reader himself, he knew that legal writing is read by professional readers-lawyers who read whole paragraphs and even pages at one time.
He appreciated the need to make legal writing "user friendly" in that
regard. He preferred the short sentence over the long one, the simple, direct word over the more esoteric but obscure reference.
One of the mainstays of his legal writing admonitions to his
clerks was his emphasis on a clear, fair presentation of the factual
background of the case. Indeed, he gave us each a manual entitled
"Ex factojus oritur"5-the law is born of the facts. He counseled us to
always draft our version of the facts from that materials of the side that
was going to lose. Using that draft as a starting point, we then went
through the tedious task of verification and then through a process of
refinement to ensure that the final rendition was a balanced presentation. He showed us time and again how the excessive use of adverbs
4 Felix Frankfurter, Mr.Justice Brandeis, 55 HARv. L. REV. 181 (1941).
5 BLAci's LAW DICIONARY 572 (6th ed. 1990).
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and adjectives could taint the integrity of our factual presentation and
ultimately warp our legal analysis.
His own legal analysis was marked by two traits: (1) his concem
about context and (2) his abhorrence of dicta. His concern with context was most evident in his attempt to place his doctrinal discussion
in historical perspective. A common law lawyer par excellence, he
took as a given that the serious reader of legal material must understand the historical development of the doctrine if he is going to be
able to perceive that doctrine's future vectors. His abhorrence of
dicta grew out of an intellectual humility that he thought ought to be
a characteristic of all legal writers: stay "on task"; take care of the problem before you; do not influence by poor writing that which you are
not prepared to decide definitively today.
The Chief Justice was also a great believer in "tone" in legal writing. Not all legal writing is intended to be as antiseptic as the usual
law review case comment. The appropriate word choice-and even
the occasional use of the passive voice-can suggest such qualities as
urgency, tentativeness, and outrage. Rigidity in writing style through
slavish adherence to arbitrary "rules" robs the legal writer of needed
weapons of communication.
No description of the Chief Justice's lessons in legal writing
would be complete without mention of his "left drawer" rule. Claiming that he had inherited the rule from a former Chief Justice, he
warned us time after time against allowing our emotions to influence
the substance and the tone of our writing. If you are angry at an opponent, he counseled, write out a draft describing exactly how you feel.
Then place it in your left hand drawer. After three days, take it out
and read it. Then revise it. Respect for all the players in the litigation,
including the "lower court," a phrase he never allowed us to use even
in internal memoranda, was essential to the integrity of the entire
process.
The lessons I learned at that long library table in the Chief Justice's study have become a part of my own perspective as I deal with
the work product of the attorneys who appear before me. I suggest
that those lessons ought to provide as well a great deal of food for
thought in your discussions about legal writing programs as part of
the law school curriculum.
First, we need to spend more time making the students conscious
of the intimate relationship between legal reasoning and legal writing.
Legal writing cannot be thought of as simply a "skills course," to the
extent that the term is used to describe parts of the curriculum less
important than "substantive" courses. Indeed, a good writing instructor ought to take the lead in convincing students that, in essence, the
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law school experience is an education in how to think. Do we emphasize sufficiently that writing is for most legal ventures the primary engine that drives the reasoning process? For the Chief Justice, the
answer was clear and he consumed legal pads and felt pens at a very
rapid rate as he thought his way through a term of court. We must
give more thought and discussion to how we can improve our students' appreciation of the relationship between writing and thinking.
Second, we need to stress that good legal writing-because it is
also good legal thinking-takes time. If it took Brandeis over ten
drafts to get it right, it will take most of us quite a few more before a
satisfactory product has been produced. This is not an easy proposition for today's law student or lawyer. Time pressures-whether from
competing course demands, or the billable hours clock in the law
firm, or the pressure of workload in government-militate against following the Brandeisian example. Here is another challenge for the
legal writing instructor: accommodating the demands of quality to the
time demands of contemporary practice.
Third, we need to stress that the writing process requires a certain
humility of mind and spirit. There must be an openness to the possibility that something "won't write out" because it does not make sense
and that a substantive course adjustment is necessary. Good legal writing requires an openness to the ever-present possibility that there is a
better way to express one's thought.
Fourth, we need to stress the use of writing as a communal tool, a
way by which lawyers can reason together to resolve differences. Students ought to be encouraged to write about divisive issues and then
to write about the same issues from a different perspective. In difficult cases, I often ask my clerks to undertake this exercise. My final
product often reflects a good deal of both versions.
Fifth, we need to emphasize the ethical dimension of legal writing. We need to stress honesty in writing style. Nothing would irritate
the ChiefJustice more than a submission that was less than frank in its
research-or in its writing. The task of decision was difficult enough
without the burden of dealing with an attorney whose play on words
made getting to the bottom of the matter that much more burdensome. A lawyer's work product ought to be comprehensive in its organization, lucid in its presentation, and without guile in its word
choice. In short, the legal writing program ought to be a prime venue
for inculcating the new member of our profession with a sense of responsibility for speaking the truth in a professional world in which, as
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Justice Douglas once put it, there are few blacks and whites; the greys
predominate, and even among the greys the shades are innumerable. 6
Sixth, we need to stress the need for civility in legal writing. Civility in legal discourse, on both sides of the bench, is fast becoming a
lost art. There are many causes for this widespread phenomenon.
The Ramboesque "winning is everything" psychosis that pervades the
work ethic of many a law firm is certainly one factor. The strident
ideological warfare present on some benches in this country is another. Our Circuit, under the leadership of our former Chief Judge,
William J. Bauer, found it necessary to undertake a massive effort to
restore the quality of discourse in our own courts. 7 You have the opportunity to deal with this problem in its most nascent stage. The newest members of the profession have to be told bluntly that they ought
not imitate their elders' rhetorical flare for the caustic. They need to
understand that such an indulgence only impedes the process of
thinking through a problem. It creates wounds that scar an adversary
long after the immediate problem has been solved. It also irritates the
judicial mind which they are trying to convince.
Seventh, we need to be sufficiently flexible in the "rules" we suggest our students follow to permit them to adjust their writing styles to
suit the many contexts in which they will be asked to write. Legal
writing need not always be sterile. Recently at oral argument, a lawyer,
believing his opponent had been too rhetorical in his presentation,
urged the bench to "take the passion out of the law." But sometimes
the law must speak passionately because the values that it protects are
ones about which a member of our profession ought to be passionate,
a virtue not incompatible with civility. At other times a certain tentativeness of expression is decidedly required because the law is in a
state of flux or because there remain factual ambiguities. Indeed,
there is even a place for an occasional use of the passive voice. As I
tell my law clerks, "If God had not wanted us to use the passive voice,
He would not have created it."
With respect to flexibility, the most significant challenge for today's legal writing instructor is equipping the student to make the necessary adjustments to different types of legal material. The Chief
Justice was a common law lawyer. His approach to legal reasoning
and his approach to legal writing were, to a very significant extent, the
product of a period in our nation's jurisprudential development when
most legal problems required common law analysis. Today, as Justice
Scalia and Judge Calabresi of the Second Circuit have reminded us in
6
7

See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948).
See STANDARDS OF CIVILITY FOR PRAcricE IN THE

7TH CIR.
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their recent works,8 we live in a legal world filled with statutory and
regulatory material. Analysis of this material requires very different
intellectual skills and, therefore, very different writing skills than those
that worked for those who practiced in a predominately common law
environment.
I remember one day in chambers when the ChiefJustice was in a
particularly good frame of mind. It soon became dear that the reason
for his buoyancy was that he had just attended a meeting of lawyers
working on alternate dispute resolution techniques and procedures.
He told us that he thought that it would take a generation for alternate dispute resolution to be accepted by the bar, but he saw in that
group of young lawyers a productive working group that would have a
salutary impact on the future. For the same reason, he would have
been cheered by the current efforts to improve legal writing education. He would have considered such work central to the profession's
progress in the next century; he would have enjoyed exploration of
ways to improve this core aspect of legal practice; he would have been
heartened by the concern such efforts manifest for the new members
of the profession, the men and women he regarded as the future of
our country.

8

See

GUIDO
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(1997).
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